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Abstract. Motivated by typo correction in password authentication, we
investigate cryptographic error-correction of secrets in settings where the
distribution of secrets is a priori (approximately) known. We refer to this
as the distribution-sensitive setting.
We design a new secure sketch called the layer-hiding hash (LHH)
that offers the best security to date. Roughly speaking, we show that
LHH saves an additional logH0(W ) bits of entropy compared to the re-
cent layered sketch construction due to Fuller, Reyzin, and Smith (FRS).
Here H0(W ) is the size of the support of the distribution W . When sup-
ports are large, as with passwords, our new construction offers a sub-
stantial security improvement.
We provide two new constructions of typo-tolerant password-based
authentication schemes. The first combines a LHH or FRS sketch with
a standard slow-to-compute hash function, and the second avoids secure
sketches entirely, correcting typos instead by checking all nearby pass-
words. Unlike the previous such brute-force-checking construction, due to
Chatterjee et al., our new construction uses a hash function whose run-
time is proportional to the popularity of the password (forcing a longer
hashing time on more popular, lower entropy passwords). We refer to this
as popularity-proportional hashing (PPH). We then introduce a frame-
work for comparing different typo-tolerant authentication approaches.
We show that PPH always offers a better time / security trade-off than
the LHH and FRS constructions, and for certain distributions outper-
forms the Chatterjee et al. construction. Elsewhere, this latter construc-
tion offers the best trade-off. In aggregate our results suggest that the
best known secure sketches are still inferior to simpler brute-force based
approaches.
1 Introduction
In many settings, secrets needed for cryptography are measured in a noisy
fashion. Biometrics such as fingerprints [31, 35], keystroke dynamics [23, 24],
voice [22], and iris scans [31] are examples — each physical measurement pro-
duces slight variants of one another. A long line of work has built ad hoc solutions
for various cryptographic settings [17, 22–24], while another line of work start-
ing with Dodis, Ostrovsky, Reyzin and Smith [13] explored a general primitive,
called a fuzzy extractor, that can reproducibly derive secret keys given noisy
measurements. The canonical fuzzy extractor construction combines a tradi-
tional key-derivation function (KDF) with a secure sketch, the latter serving as
an error-correction code that additionally leaks a bounded amount of informa-
tion about the secret.
In this work, we explore error correction for noisy secrets in the distribution-
sensitive setting, in which one knows the distribution of secrets while designing
cryptographic mechanisms. We ground our investigations in an important run-
ning case study: typo-tolerant password checking [12,20], and ultimately offer a
number of improvements, both theoretical and practical, on cryptographic error-
tolerance in general and the design of typo-tolerant password hardening systems
in particular.
Typo-tolerant password checking. Recent work by Chatterjee et al. [12]
revealed that users suffer from a high rate of typographical errors (typos), with
even a handful of simple-to-correct typos (such as caps lock or other capital-
ization errors) occurring in 10% of all login attempts at Dropbox. They offered
a usability improvement called “brute-force checking”: enumerate probable cor-
rections of the submitted (incorrect) password, and check each of them using a
previously stored slow-to-compute cryptographic hash of the correct password
(e.g., scrypt [26], argon2 [6], or the PKCS#5 hashes [18, 27]). They also show
empirically that this relaxed checking approach does not noticeably degrade se-
curity, assuming careful selection of the typos to correct.
To maintain performance, however, one must limit the runtime of password
checking. One can at most handle approximately b = RT/c errors given a runtime
budget RT and cryptographic hash function that takes time c to compute.1 Given
that c should be slow — in order to prevent brute-force attacks — the size b of
the ball, or set of potential corrections around an incorrect password, must be
fairly small. Extending to larger numbers of errors — for example we would like
to handle the most frequent 64 typos, which would account for approximately
50% of all typos seen in measurement studies — would appear to force c to be
too low to ensure security in the face of attackers that obtain the password hash
and mount dictionary attacks.
An existing alternative approach to brute-force ball search is to store, along
with the password hash, a small bit of information to help in correcting errors.
Because we want to maintain security in the case of compromise of a password
database, we must ensure that this helper information does not unduly speed
up brute-force cracking attacks. We therefore turn to secure sketches [13].
Secure sketches. Introduced by Dodis, Ostrovsky, Reyzin and Smith [13],
sketches allow correction of errors together with bounds on the information
leaked about the original secret to an attacker. Traditionally, sketch security
is measured by the conditional min-entropy H˜∞(W |s) of the secret W given the
1 This ignores parallelism, but the point remains should one consider it.
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sketch s against unbounded adversaries. Fuller, Reyzin, and Smith (FRS) [15]
show that the best one can hope for when achieving correction error at most δ
is H˜∞(W |s) ≥ Hfuzzt,∞(W ) − log(1 − δ), where Hfuzzt,∞(W ) is called the fuzzy min-
entropy of the distribution and captures the worst-case cumulative weight of all
points in a ball.
FRS give a clever construction, called layered hashing, that almost achieves
the optimal result. They prove that
H˜∞(W |s) ≥ Hfuzzt,∞(W )− log(1/δ)− log H0(W )− 1 .
Here H0(W ) is the Hartley entropy, defined to be the logarithm of the size of the
distribution’s support. The FRS construction provides better bounds than any
prior secure sketch construction (and, by the usual construction, the best known
fuzzy extractor [13]). The construction works by splitting possible secrets into
different layers according to their probability in the distribution W , and then
applying a universal hash of a specific length based on a message’s layer. Both the
layer identifier and the resulting hash value are output. Intuitively, the idea is to
tune hash lengths to balance error correction with entropy loss: more probable
points are grouped into layers that have much shorter hash values, with less
probable points grouped into layers with longer hashes.
The layered sketch works only in (what we call) the distribution-sensitive
setting, meaning that the distribution of messages must be known at the time
one designs the sketching algorithm. As another potential limitation, correcting
an error using the sketch takes time linear in the size of the ball around the
point, meaning the construction is only computationally efficient should balls be
efficiently enumerable. That said, both conditions are satisfied in some settings,
including typo-tolerant password checking: password leaks allow accurate char-
acterization of password distributions [7, 19, 21, 33] when constructing sketches,
and as mentioned above, the ball of errors required to cover most observed typos
is small and fast to enumerate.
Our contributions. In this work, we explore the open question above: How
can we securely correct more errors than Chatterjee et al. in [12]? We offer two
new approaches. The first uses secure sketching, and we give a new scheme,
called the layer-hiding hash (LHH), and prove that it leaks less information
than prior constructions. Perhaps counter-intuitively, LHH does so by actually
lengthening, rather than shortening, the output of the sketch as compared to the
FRS construction. Our second approach is a new distribution-sensitive brute-
force based technique called popularity-proportional hashing (PPH), in which
the time required to hash a password is tuned based on its popularity: The more
probable the password is, the longer the hashing should take.
Finally, we offer a framework for comparing various approaches, and show
that PPH offers a better time / security trade-off than LHH and FRS. For certain
error settings, PPH allows us to correct more errors securely than Chatterjee et
al.’s brute-force checking. Elsewhere their brute-force checking offers a better
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trade-off still. In fact, we conjecture that for many distributions no sketch will
beat brute-force based approaches.
The layer-hiding hash sketch. Our first contribution is to provide a new
sketch that we call the layer-hiding hash (LHH) sketch. We prove that LHH
enjoys an upper bound of H˜∞(W |s) ≥ Hfuzzt,∞(W )− log(1/δ)− 1, yielding a sub-
stantial saving of log H0(W ) bits of entropy over FRS. The LHH starts with the
same general approach as FRS, that of putting passwords into layers based on
their probability. The key insight is that one can, as the name implies, hide the
layer of the password underlying a sketch. To do so, the construction takes the
output of applying a layer-specific strongly universal hash to the password and
pads it to a carefully chosen maximum length with random bits. During recov-
ery, one looks for a matching prefix of the sketch value when applying (differing
length) strongly universal hashes. Hiding the level intuitively avoids leaking addi-
tional information to the adversary, but, counterintuitively, the proof of security
does not require any properties of the hash functions used. Rather, the proof
only uses that the length of hash outputs is bounded plus the fact that (unlike
in the FRS construction) sketches from different layers can collide. The proof of
correctness relies on the strong universality of the underlying hashes.
LHH’s bound improves over FRS (and, consequently, all other known con-
structions) because it removes the log H0(W ) term. The improvement in the
bound can be significant. Assuming W places non-zero probability on all pass-
words from the RockYou password leak [29] already makes log H0(W ) ≥ 3. The
min-entropy (let alone fuzzy min-entropy) of common password distributions is
commonly measured to be only about 7 bits, making a loss of 3 bits significant.
Of course, as pointed out by FRS, the loss due to log(1/δ) — which LHH also
suffers — is likely to be even more problematic since we’d like δ to be small. An
important question left open by our work is whether one can build a sketch that
replaces log(1/δ) with the optimal log(1− δ).
Sketch-based typo-tolerant checking. A seemingly attractive way of build-
ing a typo-tolerant password-based authentication scheme is to store a sketch of
the password along with a slow-to-compute hash of the password. To later au-
thenticate a submitted string, one first checks it with the slow hash and, if that
fails, uses the sketch to error correct, and checks the result with the slow hash.
In terms of security, we are primarily concerned about attackers that obtain
(e.g., by system compromise) the sketch and slow hash value and mount oﬄine
brute-force dictionary attacks. The sketch will leak some information useful to
the attacker.
The first challenge that arises in security analysis is that the traditional
sketch security measure, conditional min-entropy H˜∞(W |s), does not provide
good bounds when adversaries can make many guesses. The reason is that it
measures the worst-case probability of guessing the message given the sketch
in a single attempt, and for non-flat distributions the success probability of
subsequent guesses after the first will be much lower. We therefore introduce
a more general conditional q-min-entropy notion, denoted H˜q∞(W |s). It is the
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worst-case aggregate probability of a message being any of q values, conditioned
on the sketch. We revisit secure sketches in this new regime and analyze the
q-min-entropy for the FRS and LHH constructions. These results are actually
strictly more general since they cover the q = 1 bounds as well, and so in the
body we start with the more general treatment and show the q = 1 results
mentioned above as corollaries.
Popularity-proportional hashing. We also offer a new distribution-sensitive
variant of brute-force checking called popularity-proportional hashing. Recall
that brute-force checking uses the same slow hash function for all passwords. In
popularity-proportional hashing, we use knowledge of the distribution of pass-
words to tune the time required to hash each password. The more popular a
password, equivalently the more probable, the longer the hash computation.
In typo-tolerant hashing this has a nice effect for certain distributions: the
ball of possible passwords around a submitted string will consist of a mix of lower-
and higher-probability points, making the aggregate time required to check all of
them lower than in brute-force checking. Timing side-channels can be avoided by
fixing an upper bound on this aggregate time, and setting the hashing costs of the
scheme such that every password can be checked within this time. The checking
algorithm is then implemented to process each password for this maximum time,
and accordingly its run time reveals nothing about the password being checked.
This serves to “smooth” the distribution from the point of view of a brute-force
attacker, who must choose between checking a popular password versus lower-
cost checks of less probable passwords. We shall ultimately see that PPH offers
a better time / security trade-off than sketch-based checking using both FRS
and LHH. We note that the benefits of population-proportional hashing appear
to be specific to the typo-tolerant setting; in exact checking schemes one would
want to hash passwords with the maximum cost allowed by the runtime of the
scheme, regardless of their weight.
Comparing the approaches. We use the following methodology to compare
the time / security trade-offs of the various approaches to error-tolerant authen-
tication. First, one fixes an error setting, such as choosing a set of 64 frequently
made typos, as well as a runtime budget RT for authentication. Then, one com-
pares the brute-force attack security of various constructions that operate in
time at most RT and correct the specified errors. So for brute-force checking, for
example, one must pick a slow hash function that takes RT/64 time to compute,
and for secure sketches one can use a slow hash of time RT/2 (where for simplic-
ity we ignore the sketch cost, which is in practice negligible relative to RT). For
popularity-proportional hashing one picks hash speeds so that the ball whose
passwords have the highest aggregate probability can be checked in time RT.
With this framework in place, we prove that PPH provides a better
time / security trade-off than both FRS-assisted and LHH-assisted checking.
The proofs require lower-bounding the security of the FRS and LHH construc-
tions in the face of a computationally efficient attacker whose runtime constraint
affords him q slow hash queries (equivalently q guesses at the underlying pass-
5
word). The attack is simple: enumerate probable passwords, check which match
the sketch, and output the heaviest q that match. It may not be obvious that
this is efficient, we will argue so in the body.
To analyze the attacker’s success, we use a proof strategy which at a high
level proceeds as follows. We first model the hash underlying the sketch as a
random oracle. This is conservative as it can only make the adversary’s task
harder. We then transform the analysis of the attacker’s success probability to
a type of balls-in-bins analysis that differs slightly based on the construction.
For the FRS case, which is simpler, balls of differing sizes represent passwords
of differing weights, and bins represent individual sketch values within a layer.
The random oracle ‘throws’ the balls into the bins; the compromise of a sketch
and subsequent guessing attack is captured by sampling a bin and allowing the
attacker to choose q balls from it. As such computing a lower bound on the q-
conditional min-entropy is reduced to computing the expected (over the random
oracle coins) aggregate weight of the q heaviest balls across all bins.
Instead of tackling analysis of this expectation directly, we instead form direct
comparison with PPH by showing that with overwhelming probability the set
of points queried by an optimal brute-force adversary running in the same time
against PPH will be included in the set of points that the adversary against
FRS chooses. As such a brute-force attacker against FRS-assisted checking will
always either match or (more often) beat attacks against PPH. We derive a
similar result for LHH-assisted checking via a modified balls-in-bins experiment.
With the improvement of PPH over sketch-assisted checking established, we
next compare PPH and brute-force checking. We quantify precisely the condi-
tions which determine whether PPH or brute-force checking represents the better
trade-off for a given error setting, and show that for certain error settings PPH
allows us to correct many more errors securely than brute-force checking.
While PPH can be shown to improve on sketch-assisted checking for any dis-
tribution, the same is not true for brute-force checking — indeed there exist set-
tings in which brute-force checking will lead to a dramatic reduction in security
— and in general comparing the brute-force and sketch-assisted approaches di-
rectly appears technically challenging. However by combining the above results,
we show that for certain error settings (including passwords) the seemingly sim-
plest brute-force checking approach provides the best trade-off of all — first by
invoking the result showing PPH outperforms sketch-assisted checking, and then
by showing that brute-force checking offers an even better trade-off than PPH.
As such for any given error setting, our results can be used to determine how
many errors can be tolerated, and whether PPH or brute-force checking offers
the better approach to typo-tolerance.
Extensions and open problems. We frame our results in the context of
typo-tolerant password hashing and (reflecting the majority of in-use password
hashing functions) primarily measure hashing cost in terms of time. We will
in Section 7 briefly discuss how our results may be extended to incorporate
memory-hard functions [1–3, 6, 26] and indicate other cryptographic applica-
tions, such as authenticated encryption and fuzzy extraction, in which they are
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applicable. Finally we will discuss the key open problem — can any distribution-
sensitive secure sketch offer a better time / security trade-off than brute-force
based approaches? We conjecture that for a large class of error settings no sketch
can perform better. We offer some intuition to this end, and highlight it as an
interesting direction for future research.
2 Definitions and Preliminaries
Notation. The set of binary strings of length n is denoted by {0, 1}n. We use
⊥ to represent the null symbol. We write x||y to denote the concatenation of
two binary strings x and y, and [y]j1 to denote the binary string y truncated
to the lowest order j bits. We let [j] denote the set of integers from 1 to j
inclusive, and [j1, j2] the set of integers between j1 and j2 inclusive. The notation
x
$← X denotes sampling an element uniformly at random from the set X , and
we let x
W← X denote sampling an element from the set X according to the
distribution W . All logs are to base 2, and e denotes Euler’s constant. For a
given distribution W where M = supp(W ), we let w1, . . . , w|M| denote the
points in the support of W in order of descending probability, with associated
probabilities p1, . . . , p|M|.
Hash Functions. Here we recall the definitions of universal and strongly uni-
versal hash function families.
Definition 1. A family of hash functions F : S × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}d is said to
be universal if for all w 6= w′ ∈ S, it holds that
Pr
[
F(w; sa) = F(w′; sa) : sa $← {0, 1}`
]
= 2−d .
Definition 2. A family of hash functions F : S × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}d is said to
be strongly universal if for all w 6= w′ ∈ S, and y, y′ ∈ {0, 1}d, it holds that
Pr
[
F(w; sa) = y : sa
$← {0, 1}`
]
= 2−d , and
Pr
[
F(w; sa) = y ∧ F(w′; sa) = y′ : sa $← {0, 1}`
]
≤ 2−2d .
Error settings and typos. Let S be a set with associated distance function
dist : S × S → R≥0. If dist is a metric over S — that is to say that dist is non-
negative, symmetric, and for all x, y, z ∈ S, it holds that dist(x, z) ≤ dist(x, y) +
dist(y, z) — then we say that the pair (S, dist) is a metric space. We can assign
to S a distribution W , and let M denote the set of possible messages, M =
supp(W ). We set an error threshold t, denoting the maximum distance between
points w, w˜ for which will consider w˜ an error of w. Together these components,
(S,W, dist, t) define an error setting.
For an error setting E = (S,W, dist, t), the (closed) ball of size t around
w˜ ∈ S is the set of all points w′ ∈ supp(W ) such that dist(w′, w˜) ≤ t, that is
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Bt(w˜) = {w′ ∈ supp(W ) | dist(w′, w˜) ≤ t}. We let βmax denote the size of the
largest ball in the error setting; that is to say βmax = maxw˜|Bt(w˜)|. In this work,
we shall be especially interested in error settings for which balls are efficiently
enumerable, a property which we formalize below.
Definition 3. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting with maximum ball size
βmax. We say E has efficiently enumerable balls, if there exists an algorithm
Enum which takes as input a point w˜ ∈ S, and outputs a set of points L such
that for all w˜ ∈ S it holds that
Pr
[
L = Bt(w˜) : L $← Enum(w˜)
]
= 1 ,
and Enum runs in time polynomial in βmax.
Entropy. We now discuss several notions of entropy which capture the maxi-
mum success probability of an attacker who attempts to guess a point sampled
from a given distribution. Traditionally these notions only consider the case in
which the adversary gets one guess. However in subsequent work, when we wish
to capture the success rate of an adversary attempting to perform a brute-force
attack, it will be useful to generalize these entropy notions to capture the maxi-
mum success probability of an adversary who may output a vector of q guesses.
We define these notions below generalized to the multi-guess setting; one can
easily extract the familiar definitions by setting q = 1.
Definition 4. Let W and Z be distributions. We define the q-min-entropy of
W , denoted Hq∞(W ) to be,
Hq∞(W ) = − log
(
max
w1,...,wq
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ]
)
,
where w1, . . . , wq are distinct elements of S. The conditional q-min-entropy of
W conditioned on Z, denoted H˜q∞(W |Z), is defined to be,
H˜q∞(W |Z) = − log
(∑
z
max
w1,...,wq
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi | Z = z ] · Pr [Z = z ]
)
;
and the q-min-entropy of W joint with Z, denoted Hq∞(W,Z), is defined,
Hq∞(W,Z) = − log
(
max
w1,...,wq
z1,...,zq
q∑
i=1
Pr [W = wi ∧ Z = zi ]
)
,
where the w1, . . . , wq and z1, . . . , zq are distinct elements of the supports of W
and Z respectively. The Hartley entropy of W , denoted H0(W ), is defined to be,
H0(W ) = log |supp(W )| .
For an example which surfaces the usefulness of extending min-entropy defi-
nitions beyond one guess, consider a pair of distributions W1 and W2, such that
W1 is flat with 2
−H∞(W ) = 2−µ and W2 consists of one point of probability 2−µ
and 22µ−2µ points of probability 2−2µ. While H1∞(W1) = H1∞(W2) = µ, the two
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distributions are clearly very different, and in particular an attacker given some
q > 1 guesses to predict a value sampled from each of the distributions is going to
have a much easier time with W1. This difference is highlighted when considering
the q-min-entropy, with Hq∞(W1) = q·2−µ, whereas Hq∞(W2) = 2−µ+(q−1)·2−2µ.
In the q = 1 case, the conditional min-entropy and Hartley entropy are linked
via the chain rule for conditional min-entropy [13]. It is straightforward to see
that this result extends to the multi-guess setting; for completeness we include
a proof in the full version.
Lemma 1. Let W,Z be distributions. Then
H˜q∞(W |Z) ≥ Hq∞(W,Z)−H0(Z) .
Secure sketches. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting. Secure sketches,
introduced by Dodis et al. in [13], allow reconstruction of a message which may
be input with noise, while preserving as much of the min-entropy of the original
message as possible.
In this work we focus on sketches in the distribution-sensitive setting, in
which the distribution of secrets is precisely known at the time of designing the
sketch. While distribution-sensitivity may not always be feasible, in the case of
passwords there is a long line of work on accurately modeling the distribution of
human-chosen passwords. Primarily motivated by password cracking, modeling
techniques such as hidden Markov models (HMM) [11], probabilistic context
free grammars (PCFG) [32, 33], or neural networks [21] use the plethora of real
password leaks (e.g., [9]) to learn good estimates of W . See [19] for a detailed
discussion of these approaches. Of course, estimates may be wrong. A discussion
on the effect of transferring our results to a setting in which the distribution is
only approximately known is included in the full version. We recall the formal
definition of secure sketches below.
Definition 5. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting. A secure sketch for E
is a pair of algorithms S = (SS,Rec) defined as follows:
– SS is a randomized algorithm which takes as input w ∈ S, and outputs a bit
string s ∈ {0, 1}∗.
– Rec is an algorithm, possibly randomized, which takes as input w˜ ∈ S and
s ∈ {0, 1}∗, and outputs w′ ∈ Bt(w˜) ∪ {⊥}.
We note that we slightly modify the definition of [15] so that Rec on input
w˜ always outputs w′ ∈ Bt(w˜) ∪ {⊥}, as opposed to w′ ∈ S ∪ {⊥}. As we shall
see in the following definition, we only require Rec to return the correct point
if that point lies in Bt(w˜). As such this is mainly a syntactic change, and all
pre-existing sketch constructions discussed in this work already adhere to the
condition. In the following definition, we generalize the security requirement to
the multi-guess setting in the natural way; the usual definition (e.g. [13, 15]) is
obtained by setting q = 1.
Definition 6. A sketch S = (SS,Rec) is an ((S,W, dist, t), µ¯q, δ)-secure sketch
if:
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1. (Correctness) For all w, w˜ ∈ S for which dist(w, w˜) ≤ t, it holds that
Pr [w = w′ : w′ ← Rec(w˜,SS(w)) ] ≥ 1− δ ,
where the probability is taken over the coins used by SS and Rec.
2. (Security) The q-min-entropy of W conditioned on SS(W ) is such that,
H˜q∞(W |SS(W )) ≥ µ¯q .
Since the help string s is public any party — including the adversary — can
query Rec(·, s) on w˜ ∈ S. In an ideal secure sketch, knowledge of s would offer no
greater advantage than that gained via oracle access to Rec(·, s). In this case, an
adversary challenged to guess the original value w ∈ S is forced to guess some w˜
such that dist(w, w˜) ≤ t. To capture this notion of ideal secure sketch security,
Fuller et al. [15] introduce the notion of fuzzy min-entropy, which we generalize
to the multi-guess setting in the natural way.
Definition 7. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting. The q-fuzzy min-
entropy of W is defined to be,
Hq,fuzzt,∞ (W ) = − log
(
max
w˜1,...,w˜q
∑
w′∈∪qi=1Bt(w˜i)
Pr [W = w′ ]
)
,
where w˜1, . . . , w˜q are distinct elements of S.
3 New Bounds for FRS Sketches
In this section we describe and analyse two constructions of secure sketches due
to Fuller, Reyzin, and Smith [15]. The FRS sketches have a number of attractive
properties. The first is that these are the only secure sketches (to our knowledge)
that can be utilised with any choice of distance function dist. We would like
this flexibility so that ultimately we can tailor the distance function used to the
context of correcting password typos for which, being non-symmetric, traditional
metrics such as edit distance are not best suited [12].
Even if edit distance were appropriate, we know of no constructions which
provide sufficient security when used with parameters typical to password distri-
butions. Constructions in [13,14] either embed the edit metric into the Hamming
or set distance metrics using a low distortion embedding of Ostrovsky and Ra-
bani [25], or use a novel c-shingling technique.
As pointed out in [12], when applied to typical password distributions which
have a large alphabet of 96 ASCII characters, then even if we only attempt to
correct edit distance one errors, these constructions incur entropy loss ≈ 91 bits
and ≈ 31 bits respectively. Given that password distributions typically have at
most 8 bits of min-entropy [8], it is clear these constructions are unsuitable for
our purposes.
Most importantly, the FRS constructions achieve almost optimal security in
the q = 1 case. It was shown in [15] that high fuzzy min-entropy is a necessary
condition for the existence of a good secure sketch or fuzzy extractor for a given
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error setting, surfacing a lower bound on the security of such schemes. We recall
the result in the lemma below, which we extend to the multi-guess setting. The
proof is given in the full version.
Lemma 2.Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting, and let S = (SS,Rec) be an
((S,W, dist, t), µ¯q, δ), µ¯q, δ)-secure-sketch. Then µ¯q ≤ Hq,fuzzt,∞ (W )− log(1− δ).
FRS showed that in the distribution-sensitive setting, in which the precise
distribution is known at the time of building the sketch, high fuzzy min-entropy
also implies the existence of a good secure sketch for that distribution. We recall
their constructions, and prove new results about them.
3.1 Secure Sketches for Flat Distributions
FRS describe a secure sketch which is nearly optimal for error settings
E = (S,W, dist, t) such that W is flat, which we recall in Figure 1. We refer
to this construction as FRS1 = (FRS1-SS,FRS1-Rec).
The construction is built from a universal hash function family with output
length log(βmax) + log(1/δ) bits, where βmax denotes the size of the largest ball
in the error setting. FRS1-SS chooses a salt sa
$← {0, 1}`, computes y = F(w; sa),
and outputs s = (y, sa). On input w˜ ∈ S and s, Rec searches in Bt(w˜) for a point
w′ such that F(w′; sa) = y, returning the first match which it finds. The authors
note that the construction is not novel, with universal hash functions repre-
senting a commonly used tool for information reconciliation (e.g., [5], [28], [30]).
Correctness follows from a straightforward application of Markov’s Inequality. In
the following lemma we extend analysis to cover the q-conditional min-entropy.
The proof is given in the full version.
Lemma 3. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting for which W is flat, and
let βmax denote the size of the largest ball. Let FRS1 = (FRS1-SS,FRS1-Rec) be
as described in Figure 1, and let F : S × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}log(βmax)+log(1/δ)
be a family of universal hash functions where 0 < δ < 1. Then FRS1 is a
((S,W, dist, t), µ¯q, δ), µ¯q, δ)-secure sketch, where
µ¯q ≥ Hfuzzt,∞(W )− log(q)− log(1/δ) .
3.2 Layered Hashing for Non-flat Distributions
The above construction may be significantly less secure in settings where the
distribution in question is non-flat. In this case, having high fuzzy min-entropy
does not exclude the possibility that the distribution contains a dense ball con-
sisting of many low probability points. Disambiguating between points in this
dense ball forces a hash function with a large range to be used, which leaks more
information to adversaries.
The key idea is to split the support of the distribution into nearly flat layers;
the layer in which a point lies is determined by its probability, and the layers are
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FRS1-SS(w) :
sa
$← {0, 1}`
y ← F(w; sa)
s← (y, sa)
Ret s
FRS1-Rec(w˜, s) :
(y, sa)← s
for w′ ∈ Bt(w˜)
if F(w′; sa) = y
Ret w′
Ret ⊥
Fig. 1: Construction of a secure sketch FRS1 = (FRS1-SS,FRS1-Rec) for an error
setting E = (S,W, dist, t) from a universal hash function family F : S×{0, 1}` →
{0, 1}log(βmax)+log (1/δ). Here βmax denotes the size of the largest ball in the error
setting.
FRS2-SS(w) :
j ← L(w)
if j = λ
s← (w,⊥, λ)
else
sa
$← {0, 1}`j
y ← Fj(w; sa)
s← (y, sa, j)
Ret s
FRS2-Rec(w˜, s) :
(y, sa, j)← s
If j = λ
Ret y
for w′ ∈ Bt(w˜) ∩ Lj
if Fj(w
′; sa) = y
Ret w′
Ret ⊥
FRS2-Layer(W ) :
λ← H∞(W ) + bH0(W )− 1c
for j = µ, . . . , λ− 1
Lj ← (2−(j+1), 2−j ]
Lλ ← (0, 2−λ]
Ret {Lj : j ∈ [µ, λ]}
Fig. 2: Secure sketch FRS2 = (FRS2-SS,FRS2-Rec) for an error setting E =
(S,W, dist, t) from a set of universal hash function families Fj : S × {0, 1}`j →
{0, 1}j−Hfuzzt,∞(W )+log(1/δ)+1 for j ∈ [µ, λ], utilising layering FRS2-Layer.
defined such that the probabilities of points in any given layer differ by at most
a factor of two. We include the index of the layer in which a point lies as part
of its sketch, and then apply the secure sketch for flat distributions of Lemma 3
tuned to the parameters of the appropriate layer. Revealing the layer in which
a point lies degrades security; in an attempt to limit the damage, the number
of layers is restricted so the extra loss amounts to log H0(W ) + 1 bits; for full
details of the proof see [15].
For simplicity of exposition, we assume the existence of an efficient algorithm
L which takes as input a point w ∈ S and outputs the index j ∈ J of the layer in
which it lies. We note that the parameters required to compute the cut-off points
between layers are readily obtained from the password model, so computing the
partitions is straightforward in practice; provided we can efficiently look up the
weights of points in the password model, the algorithm L will be efficient also.
The full construction is given in Figure 2.
Theorem 1. [15] Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting. Let Fj : S ×
{0, 1}`j → {0, 1}j−Hfuzzt,∞(W )+log(1/δ)+1 be a family of universal hash functions,
where 0 < δ ≤ 12 . Consider FRS2 = (FRS2-SS,FRS2-Rec) with layering
FRS2-Layer as defined in Figure 2. Then FRS2 is a ((S,W, dist, t), µ¯1, δ)-secure
sketch where
µ¯1 = H
fuzz
t,∞(W )− log H0(W )− log (1/δ)− 1.
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In the following theorem, we provide an analysis for FRS2 in the q-min-
entropy setting. Our analysis also provides a tighter bound in the case that
q = 1. The full proof is given in the full version.
Theorem 2. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting, where Hfuzzt,∞(W ) = µ˜.
Let Fj : S × {0, 1}`j → {0, 1}j−Hfuzzt,∞(W )+log(1/δ)+1 be a family of universal
hash functions, where 0 < δ ≤ 12 . Consider FRS2 = (FRS2-SS,FRS2-Rec) with
layering FRS2-Layer as defined in Figure 2. Then FRS2 is a ((S,W, dist, t), µ¯q, δ)-
secure sketch for,
2−µ¯q ≤ Pr [W ∈ Lλ ] +
λ−1∑
j=µ
Pr [W ∈ Lj(q · |Rj |) ] .
Here Lj(q
′) denotes the set of the min{q′, |Lj |} heaviest points in layer Lj. We
let Rj = range(Fj) and let Lλ = {w ∈ W : Pr [W = w ] < 2−λ} where
λ = H∞(W ) + bH0(W )− 1c.
We note that the additional tightness in the bound is especially beneficial
when considering distributions with many sparsely populated or empty lay-
ers. To give a concrete example of a distribution for which the tightness in
the bound makes a significant difference, consider an error setting for which
W contains 299 points of weight 2−100, and 2199 points of weight 2−200, and
the case that q = 1. Since H0(W ) ≈ 199, the bound of Theorem 1 implies
that H˜∞(W |FRS2-SS(W )) ≥ Hfuzzt,∞(W ) − log(1/δ) − 8.64. In contrast applying
the new bound of Theorem 2 implies that H˜∞(W |FRS2-SS(W )) ≥ Hfuzzt,∞(W ) −
log(1/δ) − 2, (since Pr [W ∈ Lj(|Rj |) ] ≤ 2−Hfuzzt,∞(W )+log(1/δ)+1 for j = 100, 200,
and 0 otherwise). This results in a saving of over 6.6 bits of entropy.
4 A New Construction: Layer Hiding Hash
In this section we present a new construction which yields a substantial increase
in security over FRS2, while enjoying the same degree of correctness. The con-
struction, which we call layer hiding hash and denote LHH = (LHH-SS, LHH-Rec)
is similar to FRS2, but crucially does not explicitly reveal the layer in which a
point lies as part of the sketch.
First we split the distribution into layers as shown in Figure 3. Note that this
layering is slightly different to that used in FRS2. We now require a family of
strongly universal hash functions, which we use to hash points w ∈M to a fixed
length which is a parameter of the scheme, and then truncate this hash to various
lengths depending on the layer in which the point lies (in turn creating a family
of strongly universal hash functions for each layer). The strong universality of the
hash is required for the proof of correctness in which we bound the probability
that the hash of a point w collides with a given string; this represents a recovery
error and the lengths of the truncated hashes are chosen such that the probability
this event occurs is at most δ.
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The twist that enables the security savings is that rather than outputting
this truncated hash as is and revealing the layer in which a point lies, we now
view this hash as a prefix. The sketch is then computed by choosing a string at
random from the set of all strings of a given length (a parameter of the scheme)
which share that prefix. This is done efficiently by padding the hash with the
appropriate number of random bits. The effect of this is to nearly flatten the joint
distribution of W and SS(W ) such that for all w ∈ M and s ∈ supp(SS(W )),
it holds that Pr [W = w ∧ SS(W ) = s ] ≤ 2−(γ+`) (where γ indexes the layer of
least probable points, and ` denotes the length of the salt) regardless of the layer
in which the point lies. During recovery, the sketch searches in the ball of the
input for a point whose truncated hash matches the prefix of the sketch value,
and outputs the first match it finds. The full construction is shown in Figure 3.
LHH-SS(w) :
sa
$← {0, 1}`
j ← L(w)
y1 ← [F(w; sa)]
j−µ˜+log( 1
δ
)+1
1
y2
$← {0, 1}γ−j
y ← y1||y2
s← (y, sa)
Ret s
LHH-Rec(w˜, s) :
(y, sa)← s
for w′ ∈ Bt(w˜)
j′ ← L(w′)
y′ ← [F(w′; sa)]j
′−µ˜+log( 1
δ
)+1
1
if y′ = [y]
j′−µ˜+log( 1
δ
)+1
1
Ret w′
Ret ⊥
LHH-Layer(W )
γ ←
⌊
− log
(
min
w∈W
Pr [W = w ]
)⌋
for j = µ, . . . , γ
Lj ← (2−(j+1), 2−j ]
Ret {Lj : j ∈ [µ, γ]}
Fig. 3: Construction of secure sketch LHH = (LHH-SS, LHH-Rec) for an error setting
E = (S,W, dist, t) with µ˜ = Hfuzzt,∞(W ), from a family of strongly universal hash functions
F : S × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}γ−µ˜+log( 1δ )+1, utilising layering LHH-Layer.
In the following theorem we analyse the correctness and security of LHH, and
emphasise the substantial entropy saving in the q = 1 case of log H0(W ) bits in
comparison to FRS2. The proof is given in the full version.
Theorem 3. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting. Let F : S × {0, 1}` →
{0, 1}γ−Hfuzzt,∞(W )+log (1/δ)+1 be a family of strongly universal hash functions where
0 < δ < 1. Let LHH = (LHH-SS, LHH-Rec) be as shown in Figure 3 with layering
LHH-Layer. Then LHH is a ((S,W, dist, t), µ¯q, δ), µ¯q, δ)-secure sketch, where,
µ¯q = H
q·η
∞ (W
′) .
Here η = 2γ−H
fuzz
t,∞(W )+log(1/δ)+1, and W ′ is the distribution constructed by tak-
ing each point w ∈ M and replacing it with 2(γ−j) points, each of weight
Pr [W = w ] · 2−(γ−j), where w ∈ Lj. In particular in the case where q = 1,
this gives,
µ¯1 ≥ Hfuzzt,∞(W )− log (1/δ)− 1 .
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MRAPBAS,E
w
W← S
h
$← Reg(w)
w′←$AH(h)
Ret (w′ = w)
Fig. 4: Security game for password recovery in an oﬄine brute-force cracking attack
for a PBAS PBAS = (Reg,Chk) and error setting E = (S,W, dist, t).
5 Typo-Tolerant Password-Based Key Derivation
In this section we consider the application of secure sketches to typo-tolerant
password-based key-derivation functions (PBKDF). PBKDFs are used in a num-
ber of settings, for example in password-based authentication during login and
password-based encryption. PBKDFs are designed to slow attackers that mount
brute-force attacks, by incorporating a computationally slow and / or memory-
consuming task.
We begin by treating password-based authentication schemes (PBAS). We
discuss how to extend to other PBKDF settings in Section 7. Roughly speak-
ing, our results will apply in any situation in which the PBKDF-derived key
is used in a cryptographically strong authentication setting, including notably
password-based authenticated encryption. We will use an oracle model to cap-
ture computational slowness, analogous to prior treatments of PBKDFs in the
random oracle model (ROM) [4,34]. We will denote by H the oracle, and assume
it behaves as a random oracle mapping arbitrary length strings to randomly cho-
sen strings of a fixed length `H . We let H take an additional input c representing
the unit cost of querying H. We formalize such schemes below, following [12].
Definition 8. A PBAS is a pair of algorithms PBAS = (Reg,Chk) defined as
follows:
– RegH is a randomized algorithm which takes as input a password w ∈ M
and returns a string h.
– ChkH is a (possibly randomized) algorithm which takes as input w˜ ∈ S and
string h, and returns either true or false.
Both algorithms have access to oracle H(·; ·, c) : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}`sa → {0, 1}`H
where c denotes the unit cost of calling H.
The canonical scheme PBAS = (Reg,Chk), used widely in practice, has RegH
choose a random salt sa and output (sa,H(w; sa, c)). Then, ChkH(w˜, (sa, h))
computes h′ = H(w˜; sa, c) and outputs h′ ?=h. The runtime is c, the cost of one
query to H. Typically PBKDF H will be the c-fold iteration H(·; ·, c) = Hc(·; ·)
of some cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}`sa → {0, 1}`H which we
model as a random oracle. We will, in general, ignore the cost of other operations
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(e.g., the comparison h = h′) as they will be dominated by c. For example if H
consists of 10,000 iterations of a hash function such as SHA-256 then c would
be the cost of 10,000 computations of SHA-256.
We do not yet consider memory-hardness, and leave a proper treatment of it
to future work (see Section 7).
Security against cracking attacks. We will focus primarily on security
against oﬄine cracking attacks. Should an adversary obtain access to the output
of Reg, we want that it should be computationally difficult — in terms of the
number of oracle calls to H — to recover the password w. We formalize this in
game MR shown in Figure 4, a close relative of existing security notions cap-
turing brute-force attacks against passwords (e.g. [4, 16]). For an error setting
E = (S,W, dist, t), we define the advantage of an adversary A against a scheme
PBAS by
AdvmrPBAS,E(A) = Pr
[
MRAPBAS,E ⇒ true
]
.
The probability is over the coins used in the game and those of the adversary.
We assume that the adversary A has exact knowledge of the error setting E. The
number of queries A may make to oracle H is determined by its run time T and
the cost c of querying H, and for simplicity all other computations are assumed
to be free. For example if H has cost c, then an adversary A running in time T
may make q = T/c queries to H.
5.1 Brute-force checkers
To improve the usability of a given PBAS = (Reg,Chk) for some error setting
E = (S,W, dist, t), Chatterjee et al. [12] advocate retaining the original Reg
algorithm but modify the Chk algorithm to a ‘relaxed checker’ that loosens the
requirement that a password be entered exactly. They define the (what we will
call) brute-force error correction scheme PBAS-BF = (Reg,Chk-BF) as follows.
Definition 9. Let PBAS = (Reg,Chk), and let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error-
setting. Let H(·; ·, cbf) be a random oracle. Then the brute-force error-correction
scheme PBAS-BF = (Reg,Chk-BF) is defined as follows,
– Reg(w) chooses a salt sa at random, and outputs (sa,H(w; sa, cbf)).
– Chk-BF(w˜, (sa, h)) checks whether h = H(w˜; sa, cbf) or h = H(w
′; sa, cbf) for
each w′ ∈ Bt(w˜). If it finds a match, it returns true, and otherwise returns
false.
Since cbf denotes the unit cost of running H, it follows that the runtime
RT of this algorithm is the unit cost of H times the worst case ball size, i.e.,
RT = cbf ·βmax, where βmax = maxw˜|Bt(w˜)|. To avoid potential side-channels,
one may want to always compute H the same number of times, making the run
time always RT.
An adversary A running in time at most T in game MR can make at
most qbf = T/cbf queries to H. It is straightforward to see that A’s opti-
mal strategy is to query the qbf most probable points in W to H, and so
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AdvmrPBAS-BF,E(A) ≤ 2−H
qbf∞ (W ). This value is precisely the q-success rate of
Boztas [10], and is a standard measure of the predictability of a password dis-
tribution.
Empirical analysis in [12] finds that when we only attempt to correct a very
small number of errors per password (e.g. balls of size at most four) then the
brute-force checker yields a noticeable increase in usability for a small reduction
in security. However the above security bound highlights a potential limitation
of the brute-force checker; if we wish to correct balls with larger numbers of
points, we either need to accept an impractically long run time, or reduce cbf
to a level which for some error settings may result in significant security loss.
This is an important consideration in the context of password typos where the
large alphabet (of up to 96 ASCII characters depending on the password creation
policy) means that the set of points within edit distance one of a six character
string w˜ ∈ S contains well over 1000 points. This raises the question of whether
secure sketches can be employed to achieve a better time / security trade-off.
5.2 Typo-Tolerant PBAS using Secure Sketches
The error-correcting properties of secure sketches (see Section 2) make them a
natural candidate to build typo-tolerant PBAS schemes. We now describe how
to compose a secure sketch with any existing PBAS scheme to create a typo-
tolerant PBAS. The construction is so simple it is essentially folklore. See also
a discussion by Dodis et al. [13]. Our contribution here is merely to formalize it
so that we can provide a full security analysis in our computational setting.
Definition 10. Let S = (SS,Rec) be an secure-sketch for error setting E =
(S,W, dist, t). Let H(·; ·, css) be a random oracle. Then we define the scheme
PBAS-SS[S] = (Reg-SS,Chk-SS) as follows:
• Reg-SS(w) runs SS(w) to obtain a sketch s. It additionally chooses a salt
sa at random, and outputs (s, sa,H(w; sa, css)).
• Chk-SS(w˜, (s, sa, h)) first runs w′←$ Rec(s, w˜). It then checks whether h =
H(w˜; sa, css) or h = H(w
′; sa, css). If either matches, it returns true, and
otherwise returns false.
As written the run time of checking is always two calls2 to H with unit cost
css; it follows that RT = 2 ·css. One could short-circuit checking by first checking
w˜ and only computing the secure sketch if authentication fails, however side-
channels would now reveal when a user makes a typo. We would not want to
short-circuit the calculations of H on the sketch outputs, as this could reveal
even more information about w to a side-channel adversary.
An adversary B running in time at most T in game MR can make at most
qss = T/css queries to H. It is clear that B’s optimal strategy on input
(s, sa,H(w; sa, css)) is to query the qss heaviest points when ordered in terms
2 If S is perfectly correct, it would be sufficient to simply run w′ ← Rec(s, w˜) and
check if h = H(w′; sa, css), reducing the number of calls to H to one.
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of Pr [W = w | SS(W ) = s ] to H(·; sa, css). As such for a given S = (SS,Rec)
and error setting E, the definition of q-conditional min-entropy implies that
AdvmrPBAS-SS[S],E(B) ≤ 2−H˜
qss∞ (W |SS(W )).
5.3 Popularity-Proportional Hashing
We now describe a new distribution-sensitive variant of brute-force checking —
popularity-proportional hashing (PPH). We shall see in Section 6 that for certain
error settings and cracking attack run times, PPH allows us to correct more
password errors securely than brute-force checking. For all other error settings,
it serves as a useful stepping stone to show that brute-force checking provides a
superior time / security trade-off than sketch-based typo-tolerant PBAS based
on FRS and LHH.
The key idea is to partition the points in the error setting into layers based
upon their probability (as done in LHH), then have the hashing cost vary across
the layers. This is accomplished by having the PBKDF H take as input a different
iteration count for each layer. Formally, for a distribution W with Hfuzzt,∞(W ) = µ˜,
if a password w is such that Pr [W = w ] ∈ (2−(j+1), 2−j ], then hashing w incurs
a cost of cjPPH = cPPH · 2µ˜−(j+1), where cPPH is a parameter of the scheme.
By making it more computationally intensive for an attacker to hash popular
passwords, the boost to an attacker’s success probability resulting from querying
a likely password is offset by the greater cost incurred to compute the relevant
PBKDF output. We provide full details of the scheme in Figure 5. In the following
lemma, we show how to set the parameter cPPH to achieve a desired checking
run time RT.
Lemma 4. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting. Let PBAS-PPH be as
shown in Figure 5 using random oracle H. Then setting cPPH = RT implies that
RT(Chk-PPH, cPPH) ≤ RT ,
where RT(Chk-PPH, cPPH) denotes the maximum run time of Chk-PPH with
cost parameter cPPH on any input w˜ ∈ S.
Proof: Fix any point w˜ ∈ S. Then if W is such that Hfuzzt,∞(W ) = µ˜, and recalling
that w ∈ Lj implies that Pr [W = w ] > 2−(j+1) it follows that
2−µ˜ ≥ Pr [W ∈ Bt(w˜) ] >
γ∑
j=µ
|Bt(w˜) ∩ Lj |2−(j+1) .
Multiplying both sides by cPPH · 2µ˜ and recalling that cPPH = RT and cjPPH =
cPPH · 2µ˜−(j+1) gives
RT >
γ∑
j=µ
|Bt(w˜) ∩ Lj |cPPH · 2µ˜−(j+1) =
γ∑
j=µ
|Bt(w˜) ∩ Lj |cjPPH ,
where the right hand side is precisely the run time of Chk-PPH on input w˜.
Since the choice of w˜ was arbitrary, it follows that the run time of Chk-PPH on
any input w˜ ∈ S is at most RT, proving the claim.
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Reg-PPH(w) :
sa
$← {0, 1}`sa
j ← L(w)
h← H(w; sa, cjPPH)
Ret (sa, h)
Chk-PPH(w˜, (sa, h)) :
for w′ ∈ Bt(w˜)
j′ ← L(w′)
if H(w′; sa, cj
′
PPH) = y
Ret true
Ret false
PPH-Layer(W ) :
γ ←
⌊
− log
(
min
w∈M
Pr [W = w ]
)⌋
for j = µ, . . . , γ
Lj ← (2−(j+1), 2−j ]
Ret {Lj : j ∈ [µ, γ]}
Fig. 5: The popularity-proportional hashing PBAS scheme PBAS-PPH =
(Reg-PPH,Chk-PPH), from a PBKDF H such that H(·; ·, cjPPH) costs cjPPH = cPPH ·
2µ˜−(j+1) to compute where cPPH is a parameter of the scheme, and Hfuzzt,∞(W ) = µ˜. The
scheme uses layering PPH-Layer.
6 Comparing the PBAS Approaches
In the last section we saw three different ways to provide typo-tolerant password-
based authentication. Now we dig deeper into the trade-offs incurred by the
different schemes, in an attempt to determine which provides the best time /
security trade-off. We are most interested in the following question:
When balls are efficiently enumerable, can PBAS-SS ever provide a better
time / security trade-off compared to PBAS-BF/PBAS-PPH?
We will answer this question, in the negative, for the cases of using FRS or LHH.
To do so, we will fix an error setting E with computationally enumerable balls
(Definition 3), fix the time allotted to authentication, and show that for any
error setting the popularity-proportional hashing PBAS PBAS-PPH provably
provides better security than both PBAS-SS[FRS2] or PBAS-SS[LHH]. We will
then discuss the conditions on error settings and attacker run time under which
PBAS-BF offers a better trade-off still.
An incorrect interpretation of our results would be that sketches are useless.
This would be the wrong takeaway for several reasons. First, our analysis will
only be for specific sketches, not all sketches in general, and so answering our
question in full generality remains an interesting open question (see Section 7).
Second, even if the answer to our main question is negative, it only considers
computationally enumerable balls, and many of the error correction settings mo-
tivating secure sketches have balls too large to be efficiently enumerated. Poten-
tial examples include high-entropy biometrics such as iris scans and fingerprints.
Another reason is that we only consider settings where one can check that a cor-
rection is in fact correct, which allows the brute-force ball search. Finally, and
most broadly, we do not consider information theoretic security — the original
setting of most sketch constructions.
With these caveats in place, we turn to setting up a framework by which we
can make apples-to-apples comparisons between the different PBAS schemes.
Qualities of typo-tolerant PBAS. There are three key axes upon which
we compare efficacy of typo-tolerant PBAS schemes; correctness, security and
run time. Correctness is readily assessed — it is straightforward to see that for
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any error setting E and δ-correct sketch S = (SS,Rec), PBAS-SS[S] inherits the
δ-correctness of underlying sketch. On the other hand, the two brute-force cor-
rection schemes, PBAS-BF and PBAS-PPH are perfectly correct. This highlights
a bonus of the brute-force approach — if the correct password lies in the ball
around a typo, these schemes will always recover the correct point.
The comparison between the time / security trade-offs incurred by the differ-
ent approaches is less immediate. For a given PBAS, this trade-off is primarily
dictated by the computational cost c we assign to H (corresponding, in practice,
to picking larger security parameters for the slow hashing scheme). In order to
compare different approaches, we fix a runtime budget RT for checking pass-
words, set each of the schemes’ parameters to achieve maximal security subject
to the run time constraint RT, and compare the security as measured by the
message recovery game of Figure 4.
6.1 PBAS-BF versus FRS1 for Flat Distributions
As a warm up, we discuss the trade-off between PBAS-BF and PBAS[FRS1] where
FRS1 = (FRS1-SS,FRS1-Rec) (Lemma 3).
Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting, such that W is flat with H∞(W ) =
µ and maximum ball size βmax. For a given run time budget RT, setting css =
RT/2 and cbf = css · 2βmax ensures both schemes have equal run times. Let A be
an adversary in game MR running in time at most T . Letting qss = T/css, it
follows that,
AdvmrPBAS-BF,E(A) =
(
qss · βmax
2
)
2−µ ; and
AdvmrPBAS-SS[FRS1],E(A) ≤
(
qss · βmax
δ
)
2−µ .
The first statement arises since A can query at most T/cbf = qss · βmax2 points
in time T , each of which contributes weight 2−µ to its success probability. The
latter follows since B can query at most qss = T/css points in time T ; substituting
this into the bound on q-conditional min-entropy given in Lemma 3 yields the
claim. Since 0 < δ < 1 (and since δ represents the error probability of the
sketch, in practice we would like δ to be small), this clearly illustrates that in
terms of existing upper bounds PBAS-BF offers a significantly better time /
security trade-off than PBAS-SS[FRS1]. However, this does not rule out tighter
upper bounds being found. To conclusively show that PBAS-BF offers the best
performance, we would like to reverse the inequality sign in the above statement,
and prove a lower bound on security for PBAS-SS[FRS1] that is larger than the
upper bound on security for PBAS-BF.
Let’s unpick what this means. Let B be the optimal attacker in game MR
against PBAS-SS[FRS1]. We model the universal hash function family
F : S × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}log(βmax)+log(1/δ) utilized by FRS1 as a family of ran-
dom oracles H = {h}; rather than including sa $← {0, 1}` as part of the sketch,
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we now give access to the chosen random oracle h
$← {H}. We note that this
modeling is conservative, since it can only make the attacker’s job harder. With
this in place, we may lower bound AdvmrPBAS-SS[FRS1],E(A) via a balls in bins ex-
periment. We represent each point w ∈ M = supp(W ) by a ball of weight 2−µ,
and associate each of the 2log(βmax)+log(1/δ) = βmaxδ points y ∈ range(H) with
a bin. The choice of oracle h
$← H fixes a ‘throwing’ of the balls into the bins,
and the adversary’s success probability is equal to the expected weight accrued
when they are allowed to choose up to qss balls from each bin where qss = T/css.
The advantage is then calculated by taking the expectation of this total over the
coins of the random oracle.
With this in place, all we must do is show that with overwhelming probability
when we are allowed to choose at most qss balls from each bin, the resulting set
contains at least qss · βmax2 balls. Intuitively this must be the case. We would expect
each bin to contain δ·|supp(W )|βmax balls, and this value must be much larger than qss
or the attack would be trivial. As such to not hit our total, a very high proportion
of the bins must contain a number of balls which has diverged wildly from the
mean. However, formalizing this intuition is non-trivial. A theorem statement to
this end can be easily derived as a special case of those of Theorem 4; we defer
the formal statement and analysis to the full version.
6.2 PPH versus FRS2 and LHH
In this section, we show that PBAS-PPH offers a better time / security trade-
off than PBAS-SS implemented with the FRS and LHH sketch constructions of
Section 3.
To facilitate the comparison, we first set the hashing cost parameter cPPH
such that PBAS-PPH achieves the same runtime as PBAS-SS with associated
hashing cost css. With this parameter setting, PBAS-SS has checking run time
RT = 2 · css, so Lemma 4 implies that setting cPPH = 2 · css ensures PBAS-PPH
achieves run time RT also. With this in place, we now upper-bound the success
probability of an optimal attacker against PBAS-PPH with these parameters;
the proof is given in the full version.
Lemma 5. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting, where Hfuzzt,∞(W ) = µ˜. Let
PBAS-PPH be the population-proportional hashing scheme where random oracle
H has associated cost cPPH = 2·css. Let A be an adversary in game MRAPBAS-PPH,E
running in time at most T . Then,
AdvmrPBAS-PPH,E(A) ≤ qss · 2−µ˜ .
where qss = T/css.
To give the above term some context, consider the equivalent upper bounds
on success probability for sketch-based schemes PBAS-SS[FRS2], and
PBAS-SS[LHH] (which are derived by substituting the parameters of the er-
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ror setting into Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 respectively).3 For any adversary B
running in time at most T it holds that,
AdvmrPBAS-SS[FRS2],E(B) ≤ qss ·
H0(W ) · 2−(µ˜−1)
δ
, and
AdvmrPBAS-SS[LHH],E(B) ≤ qss ·
2−(µ˜−1)
δ
.
By comparison with Lemma 5, it is immediately clear that PBAS-PPH enjoys
better security upper bounds than either construction. Of course it could be that
the upper bounds on the sketches can be improved.
We therefore, in the following theorem, lower bound the success probability
of an optimal attack against PBAS-SS[FRS2] and PBAS-SS[LHH] in terms of the
advantage of any adversary against PBAS-PPH. This rules out improving the
upper bounds enough to make the sketch-based schemes better than PBAS-PPH.
We first state the theorem, then discuss its significance.
Theorem 4. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting with Hfuzzt,∞(W ) = µ˜.
Let Π-S = (Π-SS,Π-Rec) be the secure sketch for the same error setting where
Π ∈ {FRS2, LHH}, achieving 1 − δ correctness for some 0 < δ < 1. We model
the (strongly) universal hash functions used by the sketch as random oracles. Let
PBAS-SS[Π-S] be the sketch-assisted PBAS built from Π-S, and using random
oracle H with associated cost css. Let PBAS-PPH be the popularity-proportional
hashing PBAS for this error setting, with random oracle H′ with associated cost
cPPH set such that RT(Chk-SS, css) ≥ RT(Chk-PPH, cPPH). Then for any adver-
sary A against PBAS-PPH running in time at most T , there exists an adversary
B against PBAS-SS[Π-S] such that
AdvmrPBAS-PPH,E(A) ≤ AdvmrPBAS-SS[Π-S],E(B) +
(
e · δ
2
)qss
and, moreover, B runs in time T and so can make at most qss = T/css queries.
We have stated the theorem in the form of a reduction to highlight that
PBAS-PPH provides at least as good a time / security trade-off as the seemingly
more sophisticated sketch-based scheme. Given that qss will be large (this is
the number of hash computations an attacker can make), then, provided that
δ < 2/e ≈ 0.736 the second term in the bound is infinitesimally far from zero.
Since δ represents the error rate of the sketch, in practice any useable sketch will
require δ much smaller than .736.
The proof of the theorem proceeds by specifying a concrete adversary B
against PBAS-SS[Π-SS] for Π ∈ {FRS2, LHH}, where the underlying (strongly)
universal hash function family is modeled as a family of random oraclesH = {h}.
It works as one would expect: the adversary is given some sketch s and access
3 Since they are stated in terms of µ˜, we use the (looser) upper bounds here for ease
of comparison. It is straightforward to derive similar statements showing the tighter
bound are poorer too; see the proof of Theorem 4.
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to the oracle h used in the computation of the sketch. The attack queries the qss
heaviest points in the preimage set
Xs = {w ∈ supp(W ) : Pr
[
W = w ∧Π-SSh(W ) = s
]
> 0}
to the PBKDF H, where qss = T/css. This is the optimal attack.
We note that B need not compute the entire preimage set before submitting
his guesses to the oracle H — rather his most efficient strategy is to compute
the hashes of candidate points under h in descending order of weight, looking
for points which lie in the preimage set. Intuitively this will be efficient because,
assuming the sketch behaves uniformly, we would expect to find preimage set
points at fairly regular intervals. For example, if (for simplicity) the sketch was
simply h(w) = y, then the expected run time for B to find qss matches (over the
coins of h) is qss · |y| computations of h.
The proof then must show a lower bound on the success of B. This analysis
turns out to be quite tricky, involving a nuanced balls-in-bins argument. We
make things easier by targeting only a rather loose lower bound that suffices
to show the desired relationship with PBAS-PPH. We believe that better lower
bounds can be found. Better lower bounds would signify an even bigger gap
between the security of PBAS-PPH and PBAS-SS, making PBAS-PPH look even
better in comparison.
We note that while the above result shows that PBAS-PPH always offers a
better time / security trade-off than sketch-based schemes using FRS or LHH,
the same cannot be shown to hold for PBAS-BF. For example, consider an error
setting such that W consists of 249 points of weight 2−50 and 299 points of
weight 2−100, for which all balls contain a single point, except for one large ball
containing 220 of the lower weight points. As such Hfuzzt,∞(W ) = 50, and so by
Theorems 2 and 3 it is easy to see that the security of the sketch-based schemes
will degrade linearly and gracefully as T grows. On the other hand, the huge
ball of 220 points means that for matching run-times we must set cbf = 2
−19 · css
— so low that security for PBAS-BF (at least initially; see Section 6.3) degrades
dramatically compared to PBAS-SS.
This counterexample may be contrived, but for more realistic distributions
there remains a technical challenge in comparing PBAS-BF and PBAS-SS for
FRS and LHH directly. The fact that the latter schemes are parameterized by
µ˜ = Hfuzzt,∞(W ) means that the natural derived security bounds are in terms of
µ˜ also, whereas for PBAS-BF, security is dictated by the sum of the weights of
the points at the head of the distribution. Therefore any balls in bins analysis
of the form described above involves a complicated comparison between two
somewhat orthogonal terms. To overcome this, we can use PPH (whose success
probability is also a function of µ˜) as a bridge, first invoking Theorem 4 to show
that PBAS-PPH offers a better time / security trade-off than the sketch-based
PBAS and then assessing, using results in Section 6.3, whether PBAS-BF offers
a better trade-off still.
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6.3 Brute-force Checking versus PPH
In the following theorem, we quantify precisely the conditions on an error set-
ting E under which PBAS-PPH represents a better time / security trade-off than
PBAS-BF. We fix a run time RT for the checking algorithms of both schemes,
and set the associated hashing cost cbf and hashing cost parameter cPPH in a
way that ensures both schemes work within this run time. We then consider the
success probabilities of optimal adversaries attacking the schemes, both running
in some time T .
The following theorem formally captures our comparison of the two schemes.
Roughly speaking, the result indicates that there exists a crossover point: for T
smaller than this point, PBAS-PPH provides better security than PBAS-BF, and
for T larger than this point, the inverse is true. The crossover point is dictated
by the error setting. As we discuss in more detail below, the crossover point for
typical error distributions seen with human-chosen passwords is actually pretty
small, meaning that PBAS-BF would appear to dominate for distributions of
practical interest. Whether PBAS-PPH can be improved is an open question.
Theorem 5. Let E = (S,W, dist, t) be an error setting, where Hfuzzt,∞(W ) = µ˜ and
the largest ball is of size βmax. Let PBAS-BF = (Reg,Chk-BF) be the brute-force
PBAS error correction scheme of Definition 9, using oracle H with associated
cost cbf and run time budget RT. Let PBAS-PPH = (Reg-PPH,Chk-PPH) be
as shown in Figure 5, using an oracle H′ with associated cost parameter cPPH
set such that RT(Chk-BF, cbf) ≥ RT(Chk-PPH, cPPH). Let A and B be optimal
attackers in games MRAPBAS-PPH,E and MR
B
PBAS-BF,E respectively running in time
T . Let qbf = T/cbf = T · βmax/RT. Then if T is such that
T ≤
(
2−H
qbf∞ (W ) · 2(µ˜−1)
)
· RT ,
it holds that AdvmrPBAS-PPH,E(A) ≤ AdvmrPBAS-BF,E(B). For all error settings such
that,
T ≥
(
2−H
qbf∞ (W ) · 2µ˜ + 1
)
· RT ,
it holds that AdvmrPBAS-BF,E(B) ≤ AdvmrPBAS-PPH,E(A).
The proof works by upper and lower bounding the success probability of an
optimal attacker against PPH, and comparing this to the success probability of
an optimal attacker against the brute-force checker. The proof is given in the
full version.
At a high level, the first bound in the theorem shows that PBAS-PPH favors
error settings for which the weight of points decreases slowly (relative to the
attack run time) as we move down through the distribution starting from the
heaviest point. In such error settings PBAS-PPH allows us to securely correct
larger balls — and accordingly more errors — than brute-force checking, pro-
vided balls are constructed such that the fuzzy min-entropy is high. This latter
requirement is not much of a restriction, since a well designed error setting will
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seek to maximize the utility for a given level of security by defining balls to have
many points but low aggregate mass. For most such error settings, while there
will be a point after which PBAS-BF offers the better time / security trade-off,
this will be for an attack run time too large to be of concern. This class of dis-
tributions includes those described in Section 6.2 for which brute-force checking
degrades security dramatically.
On the other hand, the second bound shows that if the weight of points
decreases quickly as we move down through the distribution, then PBAS-BF
offers the better time / security trade-off. Intuitively this is because, as the
weight of points decreases, the gap between the (higher) hashing cost under PPH
decreases until it is, in fact, lower than the hashing cost used with PBAS-BF. As
such the crossover point after which brute-force checking offers the better trade-
off falls within the attack run times of concern. Since password distributions are
typically very ‘top-heavy’, with the weights of points decreasing rapidly to leave
a long tail, they fall into the class for which brute-force checking offers the better
time / security trade-off.
The theorem gives both upper and lower bounds on T , with a small gap
between them, meaning the crossover point is not precisely pinned down. This
is due to a small amount of slack in upper and lower bounding the success
probability of an optimal attacker against PBAS-PPH for general error settings.
For specific error settings, one can sharpen the analysis.
7 Conclusion
In this work we investigated error correction for cryptographic secrets in the
known-distribution setting. Using typo-tolerant password checking as a guiding
case study, we provided several improvements on both theory and practice. On
the theory side, we introduced a new information-theoretic security goal for
secure sketches that better matches the needs of applications that may allow
an attacker to make multiple guesses about the secret. While for high-entropy
settings the distinction is moot, for passwords it is critical. We then provided
analysis of the best known schemes in this setting, due to Fuller et al. [15].
Our first main contribution was the design and analysis of a new secure sketch
construction, the layer-hiding hash (LHH). We proved that it provides better
security than prior schemes. We then introduced a new distribution-sensitive
brute-force based technique called property-proportional hashing (PPH) that,
unlike the prior brute-force checking approach of Chatterjee et al. [12], varies
the run time of the hash function according to the popularity of the password
being hashed.
We gave a framework for comparing different approaches to typo-tolerant
authentication, and used it to show that PPH outperforms sketch-based solutions
to typo-tolerance, even when using the layer-hiding hash sketch. We determine
the conditions under which PPH improves on the brute-force checking approach
of Chatterjee et al. [12], along with the conditions under which their simpler
brute-force checking offers a better trade-off. Put all together, our results indicate
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that brute-force based approaches perform better than the best known secure
sketches. We now finish with a few important points and open questions.
Complexity beyond time. Most in-use slow hashes only target extending the
time required for a single hash computation. Increasingly, however, practition-
ers are transitioning to slow hashing that targets memory-hardness [1–3, 6, 26],
meaning that computing a hash requires that the space-time complexity (the
product of memory and time utilized) is lower bounded. Our constructions work
with memory-hard hash functions as well, though our comparisons of differ-
ent approaches currently only considers time complexity. Future work may also
consider parallel computation models, which could be useful when a password
checking system can use multiple cores to simultaneously check multiple possible
corrections.
Additional applications. While we motivated and used as a running example
the setting of password-based authentication, our constructions are generic. They
hold for any distribution-sensitive setting in which one has efficiently enumerable
balls (the same general setting considered by FRS). The FRS, LHH, and PPH
approaches will not work for error settings with large balls, such as attempting
to correct large Hamming or edit distances. In these contexts, existing secure
sketch constructions [13, 14] seem to be the only solution. We note that their
entropy loss is significantly worse than the FRS or LHH constructions, and so
they would not seem useful for passwords.
We have focused on authentication, but our results and comparisons are ap-
plicable to any cryptographic application in which noisy secrets are used to derive
a key for which one can efficiently test correctness. This includes at least all au-
thentication primitives, such as message authentication codes and authenticated
encryption. Similarly, our new sketch constructions can also be used to build
a fuzzy extractor using the construction from [13], which inherits the security
improvement over the fuzzy extractor from FRS.
Secure sketches in the multi-guess setting. In the previous section, we
proved that PBAS-SS never offers a better time / security trade-off than
PBAS-PPH/PBAS-BF when implemented with the FRS sketches, and the new
— and nearly optimal, in the single-guess setting — LHH sketch. The key open
question is whether any distribution-sensitive secure sketch can perform better
in this context. The challenge is to design a sketch which preserves much of the
min-entropy of the underlying distribution in the face of an attacker who can
make q guesses for varying and large values of q. This is an important require-
ment in many practical settings, yet has been overlooked in existing literature.
Intuitively, the correctness requirement means that the sketch must include
sufficient information to disambiguate between points in the heaviest ball(s).
As such any efficiently-computable sketch — (we disregard those which, for ex-
ample, solve an NP-hard problem to create an optimal arrangement of points
into sketch preimage sets) — is likely to leak more information than is strictly
necessary for correctness in less heavy balls. This additional leakage can then
be exploited by an attacker. More generally we would expect that the larger
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q is, the wider the gap between the security of a sketch S = (SS,Rec) for
that error setting H˜q∞(W |SS(W )), and the theoretical best case security bound
Hq,fuzzt,∞ (W )− log(1− δ).
We conjecture that for a significant class of error-settings — especially those
such as passwords, which inherently contain large balls — no efficient distribution
sensitive secure sketch can offer a better time / security trade-off than brute-
force based approaches. Indeed it seems likely that any intuition leading to an
improvement in secure sketch performance over LHH may be utilized to create
a brute-force approach which improves on PBAS-PPH (similar to the way in
which the same layered approach is used by both LHH and PPH, with better
performance in the latter). Refining and improving upon the brute-force based
approaches described here is an interesting open problem.
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